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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS—VALIDITY OF APPROPRIATIONS—ORDINANCES—CONCLUSIVENESS—CITY OF CHICAGO ET AL. v. NICHOLS, 52 N. E. (Ill.) 359.—An order was issued for the expenditure of a further sum for lighting the streets, after the City Council had appropriated a certain sum for lighting the city. By Rev. St. c. 24 § 90, no expense can be incurred by the city for any purpose in excess of the amount provided therefor in the annual appropriation bill, unless warranted by some "casualty" or "accident." *Held*, that the construction of elevated railroads and depots in the streets, whereby the streets were darkened, and the combination, though unlawful, of electric and gas lighting companies, whereby the prices of lighting were raised, is not such "casualty" or "accident," nor is the declaration of the City Council that it is such conclusive in a court of law.

PROPERTY—EASEMENTS—MOON v. MILLS, 77 N. W. 926 (Mich.).—The owner of property abutting on an alley twelve feet wide had a perpetual right of way over it, in common with other abutters, and maintained an outside stairway and platform over the alley, thirty-five inches wide, which did not incommode the other abutters. The alley was never dedicated to the public by any fiat. *Held*, that he could not be compelled to remove the obstructions. One of the owners in common of a way, who erects an obstruction on his part, beneficial to himself, and which does not tend to incommode one who has an equal right, cannot be compelled to remove such obstruction.

PROPERTY—GIFT CAUSA MORTIS—DELIVERY—CAYLOR v. CAYLOR'S ESTATE, 52 N. E. (Ind.) 465.—Deceased, an hour before her death, called for her nephew, and being told he was not present, directed her husband to deliver certain personal property of hers which he had then in his possession to her nephew, to whom she declared she wished to give all her property; and the husband promised to carry out her request. *Held*, sufficient to establish a *donatio causa mortis* in favor of the nephew, although there was no manual delivery of the property either to him or to deceased's husband. Compare with *Liebe v. Battman*, 54 Pac. 179, YALE LAW JOURNAL, vol. VIII, p. 102, where, under the circumstances of the case, the court held there was no gift.

PROPERTY—MECHANICS' LIENS—PRIORITY OF VENDORS' LIENS—COOLEY ET AL. v. BLACK, 48 S. W. Rep. 1075 (Kent.).—A statute providing that one who performs labor and furnishes materials in the erection of a building "shall have a lien thereon, and on the land upon which such improvements may have been made, or on any interest the owner has in the same, to secure the amount thereof." *Held*, that the lien of a vendor of the land, which extends to buildings subsequently erected thereon, is superior to mechanics' lien as given in above statute. Guffy, J., dissenting.

PROPERTY—REPLEVIN OF PROPERTY EXEMPT FROM EXECUTION—PRESCOTT v. STARKEY ET AL., 41 Atl. 1021 (Vt.).—Vermont statutes provide that when goods are unlawfully taken or detained, or when goods which are attached or taken in execution are claimed by a person other than the defendant in the suit or debtor in execution, they may be replevied. Goods of a defendant that were exempt from attachment or execution were attached. *Held*, that these goods could not be replevied by the defendant. Tyler and Thompson, J. J., dissented on the ground that exempt property taken by an officer on attachment is wrongfully taken and is not taken under the attachment.